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The Peronist and the ghost in the state of Australia
Abstract
The spirit in this article is that of liberal democracy, that precisely state of affairs in which there exists a
separation of powers among the executive, legislature and judiciary, an independence of the judiciary and
a substantive independence of the legislature from the executive. Additionally, in the 19th century there
was added to this structure, in the United Kingdom and subsequently in the Australian colonies, a tenured
civil service. Writers in mid to late Victorian Britain saw this addition as a necessary restraint on a
Parliament elected by an ever-widening franchise comparable — if one listens to Maine’s gloomy
assessment of popularly elected legislatures (Maine 1897, Essay II) — to the process of judicial review
established in the United States. However undemocratic in origin, the civil service nevertheless operated
by guaranteeing — in the eyes of the political ‘establishment’ — disinterested advice to secretaries of state
and ministers, to help ensure that those selected to government were, so far as possible, given the
information upon which to make choices, and therefore to carry responsibility to the legislature for those
choices. Its very paternalism in restraining ‘irresponsible’ popular politics helped ensure the answerability
of government to popular politics.
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Ian Duncanson
The spirit of liberal democracy
The spirit in this article is that of liberal democracy, that precisely state
of affairs in which there exists a separation of powers among the executive, legislature and judiciary, an independence of the judiciary and
a substantive independence of the legislature from the executive. Additionally, in the 19th century there was added to this structure, in the
United Kingdom and subsequently in the Australian colonies, a tenured
civil service. Writers in mid to late Victorian Britain saw this addition
as a necessary restraint on a Parliament elected by an ever-widening
franchise comparable — if one listens to Maine’s gloomy assessment
of popularly elected legislatures (Maine 1897, Essay II) — to the process of judicial review established in the United States. However undemocratic in origin, the civil service nevertheless operated by guaranteeing — in the eyes of the political ‘establishment’ — disinterested
advice to secretaries of state and ministers, to help ensure that those
selected to government were, so far as possible, given the information
upon which to make choices, and therefore to carry responsibility to
the legislature for those choices. Its very paternalism in restraining
‘irresponsible’ popular politics helped ensure the answerability of government to popular politics.
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Disinterest is not, of course, neutrality. The British civil service
designed by the Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1853 assumed that the
political pre-eminence of the upper middle class and aristocracy was
inevitable and beneficial, and that the interest of that class alliance in
maintaining at all costs the economic supremacy of City finance capital, was in the public interest (Cowan 1987). Nevertheless, such assumptions are a contingent feature of what was undoubtedly a check
on what Stuart Hall has termed authoritarian populism (1988: ch 4).
According to Maine, anticipating Hall’s analysis, one of the ‘fundamental infirmities’ of democracy in large polities was overcome by the
principle first established in the new United States, of representation,
but that resolution was itself at risk once political parties achieved such
organisational power that members of the legislature ceased to represent their constituents and became instead delegates of Party (Maine
1897: 94) — or perhaps, in the US, hostages to corporate interests
(Bakan 2003). In the contexts of the fears expressed by Maine and
Hall about the dangers to British, and by implication, antipodean, democracy, one reads with alarm if not surprise that Australia’s new experiment with authoritarian populism began with an attack on its public bureaucracy amounting to
… a bloodbath of unprecedented proportions. On assuming office [Howard,
the new Prime Minister as of 1996] sacked a full third of all department
heads and replaced them with hand-picked substitutes whose talents seemed
to lie more in their loyalty to the new government than in their eagerness
to give frank and impartial advice (MacCallum 2004: 64).

What was abandoned in 1996, if not earlier, the argument runs, was
the older conviction that the colonies brought to the federation named
the Commonwealth of Australia — an evocative name — in 1901:
A knowledge and a conviction that the state would be the most likely protector of individual rights against other agents of coercion, and that the
major constraints on civil liberty were not public but private (Pusey 1991:
1).

From the point of view of organised labour, an important ingredient in the establishment of federation (Kelly 1992), if not always an
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enthusiastic agitator for it (Macintyre 1999) restraints on public institutions are insufficient to secure liberal democracy in the face of the
powerful private interests represented by organised capital. Negative
liberty is not enough to prevent the individual’s being subordinated
into a mere consumer or employee. If s/he is to be a citizen, that is to
say, an active participant, more is required.
To the freedom of expression, too, that Hume considered vital to
the construction of the subject as citizen (Hume 1777 [1985]: 9), we
have to add machinery that would facilitate substantially free access to
information about the means by which government is accomplished,
decisions reached and alternatives precluded. The implications for liberal democracy of a monolithically owned media — media controlled
by a cartel of rich white men anxious to support whatever government
offers the most profitable patronage to their media, but also other interests — is liberal democracy’s demise. The implication of the nowroutine secret ‘commercial-in-confidence clauses’ in ‘public–private
partnerships’ and government asset sales,2 is that citizenship is demeaned
and diminished. Citizenship is merely derided when decisions such as
those dishonestly made recently by governments in Britain, the US
and Australia on the basis of distorted intelligence reports to wage war
on Iraq contradict treaties made by previously elected governments
(Wilkie 2004, Melbourne Age 9 August 2004) — most obviously the
treaty obligation not to wage war without direct United Nations sanction.
In Australia, government justifications for the Iraq war have changed
retrospectively, as no nuclear or imminent nuclear capacity, no chemical or biological weapons, and no danger to countries beyond Iraq’s
boundaries have been found; and as the patently absurd claim that a
secular dictatorship such as Saddam’s had connections with religious
terrorist groups has predictably proved false. The goal of removing
Saddam because of the brutality of his regime was explicitly rejected
as a war aim prior to the invasion, presumably because such an aim
would have contradicted the support given by all three countries to
numerous brutal regimes, including to Saddam himself. But, government PR automata, trained, perhaps, to sell peas or swimming pool
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purifiers, have emerged with equal zeal to sell the ‘product’ of government justifications for putting citizens at risk with stories that properly
belong in the pages of JM Barrie, of Peter Pan, Wendy and the villainous Captain Hook. Ironically, of course, the Iraqis for whom such sympathy is now mobilised are the compatriots hitherto demonised and
detained in appalling conditions in desert camps in violation of Australia’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in breach of its own laws, including its Constitution
(Burnside 2004).
Media owned by those with much to gain by supporting government give scant room to dissent from what we might have termed the
government line, were it not so vague and opportunistically flexible as
scarcely to constitute a line. What less dependent print media exists
displays its lack of bias3 with prominent columns containing the musings
of former government speech writers, members of government, and
syndicated columns from right of centre overseas writers.
To the equality of citizens demanded even in jurisdictions (unlike
Australia) that possess standard bills or charters of rights, we need to
add Marx’s observation (Marx 1843 [1975], III: 153), that a ‘political
equality’ that is not practised in the context of attempts to accomplish
a much more broadly conceived social equality — attempts that we
now associate with the welfare state: health, education, employment
protection and income support — actually preserves existing political
inequality. A functioning liberal democracy, then, also needs to be a
social democracy, just as social democracy requires as its precondition
those institutions and commitments that we associate with the classical
liberalism of JS Mill. I will use the term liberal democracy to include
social democracy.
My argument is that Australia has never fully implemented liberal
democracy in the sense in which I have used it, though perhaps that
was its federation trajectory, if we ignore the racism fundamental to
the colonial union (Duncanson 2002). Currently, the regime is retreating from the tenets of liberal democracy at a rapid rate (Rundle 2002)
and seems indeed to have embraced — if not uniquely among contemporary Anglophone political cultures — a kind of Peronism.4 Election
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victories become empty mandates to pursue previously undisclosed or
hitherto non-existent policies. Opportunistic opinion polls act as plebiscites on single issues, only one side of which may reach public attention. In government itself, especially in Australia, since the People are
taken to have spoken at the election, there is no need of constitutional
checks; there is little need of ministerial responsibility to the legislature if the Leader has confidence in him or her. A public service, now
largely without tenure, selected according to criteria of political loyalty, can shelter a minister, whilst remaining invisible, by supplying or
purporting to supply only certain information. Ministerial ignorance
of matters relating to his or her portfolio no longer seems to indicate
either his or her culpability or the failure of the system of representative government. Or, we might say, government now represents itself
with the object, simply of maintaining itself in office.

Stat(e)ing
If we follow the argument of Benno Teschke’s recent text (2003), the
first modern state was none of the polymorphous organisations that
collectively participated in what he terms ‘the myth of Westphalia’.
Conventionally, the treaties of Munster and Osnabruck of 1648,
collectively known as the Peace of Westphalia, are considered to have
inaugurated international law as the relations between newly conceived
political forms — modern states — each politically autonomous with a
hierarchically organised sovereign government and definitively
bounded geographies. Teschke, by contrast, argues that the modern
state is inseparable from the rise of the capitalist organisation of
economic production,5 around which particular forms of legal and fiscal
apparatus develop which contrast with the ramshackle jurisdictional
practices and inefficient tax-farming means of revenue raising to which
Louis XIV, the classic Absolutist monarch remained, precisely, subject.
Forty years after Westphalia, mercantile and agrarian elites finally took
control of England in their Glorious Revolution, creating a polity as
economically advanced but more coherent politically than the United
Provinces, many of whose financial practices they adopted. It was larger
than the United Provinces and, with the addition of Scotland by the
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Act of Union of 1707, became, as every child knows, the largest free
trade zone in Europe. This is Teschke’s first properly modern state.
This externally aggressive ‘fiscal-military state’ (Brewer 1989),
according to Teschke, forced European states into modernity through
its continual defeats of them, subsidising allies to confront its enemies
on the continent, and directly confronting European rivals, militarily
and economically over most of the world. In more ways than one, the
first modern revolution ‘and its defining documents, the Declaration
and Bill of Rights, have continued to provide a template for constitutions
and political manifestos to the present day’ (Prest 1998: 68).
In contrast to its political cohesion, its fiscal efficiency and its military power, Britain’s constitutional basis was one of studied vagueness. The 17th century revolutions and the memory of their attendant
chaos had, Roy Porter writes (2000), persuaded its leaders to mistrust
enthusiasm and assertions of certainty in both religious and connectedly
political registers — a mistrust manifested classically in Hume (Hume
1736 [1978])6 — which recent experience seemed to have shown, led
to confrontation and conflict. If, as John Phillip Reid has it, ‘eighteenth century British political theory was wrenched with the eternal
predicament that government power was needed because humans had
to be policed, but because mere humans exercised government power,
humans could not be trusted with power’ (1991: 129), politeness became the preferred form of policing practice, securing the polity at
least in the early years of the Revolution. Shaftesbury and Locke (Klein
1994, Locke 1693), whether consciously or not, import many of the
preoccupations of the 16th, early 17th century European writer,
Althusius. His main concern was with the ‘promotion of civility and
virtue throughout civic life from conversation to eating’. If we know
our etiquette, a new and peaceful form of social reality becomes possible in which government is based on the populus, ‘defined as the web
of corporations’, each of which has its own government, ‘none of them
wielding absolute power’ (van Gelderen 2003: 87). Civility and civil
life are linked in early Europe in the same way as politeness and the
polity in what will be, by the 18th century, the ‘free-born Englishman’.
They were based on what they could be, convention. And, of course,
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the Convention Parliament, illegal under the Stuart constitution, and
made legal only according to the conventions of authority its participants initiated and accepted, was what had made the English experiment possible.
The disavowal of this polite, compromising basis for the polity in
favour of something more abstract, but also more muscular, more apt
for a global power, is something we associate with Bentham and his
followers, preoccupied as they were with applying social engineering
experiments to luckless subjects. During the last third of the 18th century, a number of political developments parallel the authoritarianism
implicit in Bentham’s more Hobbesian contention that law is the sign
of the volition of the sovereign (Bentham 1970: 1). Following Clive’s
spectacular conquests in India, East India Company officials began, in
effect, evoking the Hobbesian notion of sovereignty by conquest to
justify their rule over Bengalis and subsequently others on the subcontinent (Guha 1982: 33).
In the eyes of increasing numbers of English observers, the empire of the
seas, once idealized as the domain of free white peoples, had become the
imperium of palpably alien colonial subjects, and the nation was confined
increasingly to the island of Great Britain itself; even Ireland was excluded
(Wilson 2003: 11).

Ireland was, of course, incorporated into the Union in 1800, but not as
an equal partner: as Theodore Allen puts it:
… the distinguished historian and Abolitionist, Henry Hallam (1777-1859)
pointed out the racist affinity of the Spanish genocide of Christian Moors
and the English oppression of the Irish … The pre-eminent Anglo-Irish
historian William Lecky noted how the people of the English Pale in Ireland “came to look upon the Irish much as later colonists came to look on
Red Indians” (1994: 29).

Nothing of the above was changed by the union imposed in 1800, and
it was in vain for those who objected to observe that in 1778, the secret
Carlisle Commission had (equally vainly) attempted to preserve the
Atlantic empire by offering equal status with Westminster to the American colonial assemblies (Harlow 1952, I: 527). Why, it was asked,
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could the Irish Parliament not have equivalent status to that envisaged
for the American assemblies? But Ireland was to be governed by a
sovereign Parliament in London without even the mediation of a protestant Parliament in Dublin. The continuing process, to which Michael
Collins (1916 [1996]) points, of non-recognition of indigenous law,
property and religion in Ireland would be shared under the second
empire by indigenous, ‘primitive’ peoples from Scotland to Australia.
Henry Reynolds writes movingly of the dispossession of the Aborigines (1987). Less well-remembered, perhaps because of their own scattering and assimilation to other cultures, and the later romantic appropriation of the Highlanders’ past were the more or less contemporaneous Clearances: ‘the contempt for the Highlander was responsible for
the brutalities that followed Culloden [in 1746] and the same indifference to his way of life was shown when the Clearances began fifty
years later’ (Prebble 1968: 10).
The spectre of a broader liberal democratic citizenship discernible
in the emphasis on convention and politeness (Wilson 1995) nevertheless haunts the political and legal positivists. In his discussion of
Bentham’s well-known terror regarding the supernatural, Miran
Bozovic suggests that our fear of ghosts arises precisely because we
don’t believe in them (1995: Introduction). What frightens us in the
haunted house is what is not in it, what is impossible, unheimlich. The
citizen of liberal democracy with whose trace I’m concerned, often
assumes the form of this impossible, non-being in the more authoritarian mentalité of certain second empire figures, rulers, and those who
justified their form of rule. Austin, as we know, fled this uncanny being, renouncing legal positivism in his Plea for the Constitution in
1853 (Hamburger & Hamburger 1985: ch 9). Dicey, too, abandoned
Austinian Parliamentary sovereignty for a time, when the legislature
contemplated Home Rule for Ireland, glimpsing briefly the citizenlegislator with values behind the abstraction of Dicey’s own sovereign, a citizen with a volition that did not reflect of Dicey (Heuston
1964: ch 1).
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The APEC meeting
The suggestion that this ghostly citizen has been somehow made less
uncanny by electoral reform, perhaps even charters of rights, was thrown
into doubt by the collection that prompted this article, Pepper in Our
Eyes published by Wesley Pue, a law professor at the University of
British Columbia, after the scandal of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia in 1997.
Pue was not originally a human rights or even a constitutional lawyer,
but a historian of common law with a particular interest in the political
process of common law diaspora in the western regions of the Dominion of Canada (2000, 2001). He happened across the APEC disturbances because they unfolded almost literally outside the window of
his office in the UBC Law Faculty building, a room above an entrance
concretely inscribed with the maxim, ‘fiat justitia, ruat coelum’. Let
Justice be done, though the heavens fall.
The conventional Whig notion of balance that qualifies the extremism of that motto and forms an elusive if appealing component in the
ideology of the Atlantic world before its late 18th century collapse, represented itself in some of the Canadian reactions, articulated by Pue,
to their government’s realism, its attraction to the idea of politics as a
particular form of art, the art of the possible. Prior to the APEC meeting there had been considerable indignation in some Canadian circles
that the country was hosting a meeting of leaders of some very dubious regimes. As if to confirm the grounds of this indignation, Suharto,
then president of Indonesia and who famously came to power in a
coup that was also the slaughter of some half-million, largely Chinese,
Indonesians, expressed a wish not to be ‘embarrassed’ in Canada during the leader’s meeting by public demonstrations of opposition both
to his by then notoriously corrupt and repressive regime, and to Canada’s association with it.
The meeting nevertheless took place in the Museum of Anthropology of the Pacific Coast on the edge of the University of British Columbia campus, a place of re-collection and meditation about First
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Peoples and the inscriptions of their hope of reconciliation and coming-together with the invaders from Europe. Protests were planned along
the route the motorcade was to take to the museum from the luxury
hotels of downtown Vancouver through the University of British Columbia campus, two minutes’ walk from the Law Faculty, and even
less from Green College, a graduate student and scholarly visitors’
residence.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which, rather than the
Vancouver Police, exercises jurisdiction on campus land, preserved
Suharto from embarrassment with enthusiasm, confiscating banners
and assaulting and arresting peaceful protesters even outside the antiembarrassment exclusion zone they had set up. Crowds were doused
with pepper spray, beaten, handcuffed, and in the case of one man,
detained for 14 hours without charge. Pue’s and other law academics’
initial responses were understandably to this police violence,
inappropriate, they insisted, at a peaceful protest. Of course there is no
doubt an ingredient of violence in confronting dictators, leaders of
authoritarian regimes, or even on other occasions, to think of one
example, those employers who appropriate one’s labour without
balanced negotiations concerning the conditions in which they do so
(Green 1990), with disagreement, non-compliance, resistance and the
utterance of loud, frank and vocal and written evaluations of dictatorial
conduct on the streets or adjoining buildings. In the haunted state, how
dare the subject question the way it is administered, embarrassing its
rulers and presuming to the uncanny status of participating citizen?
The principally symbolic violence involved in confronting oppression with assertions of its illegitimacy, is, on the other hand, of a kind
that liberal democracies would protect — rather than feel provoked to
physically violent retaliation by its manifestation when their citizens
engage in it — through policing in both its old (ie, the activity of maintaining a healthy polity), and its more restrictive and new, meaning.
One could venture further and suggest that the failure of citizens to
engage in that kind of violence signals a dangerous decline in democratic commitment. Policing in its older sense might include precautions against such a decline.
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When it became clear to the Canadian federal government that the
physical and repressive violence of the RCMP at UBC would not be
allowed on this occasion univocally to be portrayed in the media as
more the work of a few ‘bad apples’ among the Mounties, a federal
inquiry was set up. Complainants to it and beyond argued that the excessive use of force by federal police was not all that there was to
object to. The entire episode, they argued, was symptomatic of a deeper
constitutional problem that gave too much power to the federal government to impose its will on reluctant Canadians, namely the too close
links between police leadership and the office of the Prime Minister.
The police, law academics claimed — with a commendable awareness
of possible tautology in a world were politics has become the art of
what is often depressingly possible — had been politicised.
Following this evident belief that politics is the art of the possible
when others would rather he had tried something more ambitious, the
then Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien had been, despite the repressed
complaints, able to showcase his government as a responsible member
of the APEC, an organisation that assiduously avoids discussing anything but the narrowly defined economic policies of its members. He
was able to exorcise the superstitious fears of the dictators among his
guests, that the spectres of democracy or human rights would be allowed to haunt them in the mellow daylight of a Canadian university
campus, between the Faculty of Law now revealed unexpectedly to be
without the faculty of constituting liberal democratic citizens, and an
evocatively named Green College. Refusing to respond to complaints
— Chrétien refused to give evidence to the inquiry — his government
simultaneously concealed and revealed what many suspected was its
complicity in the heavy policing at UBC.

Two events in Australia: tropes and troops
One is reminded of the cliché of politics as the art of the (depressingly)
possible by recent events in Australia. The first is the famous waterfront conflict. There was here, according to the leading account of it
(Trinca & Davies 2000), a plan to substitute newly trained, non-union
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personnel, some ex-, some not so ex-military, for the existing unionised labour force on the docks around Australia. The federal government was apparently strongly implicated in the plan, although the details of this were obscured by an out of court settlement of the Maritime Union of Australia’s conspiracy action against the government.
Dubai was originally intended to be the site of the non-union
workforce’s training, but this was thwarted by the organisation of international waterside workers. In the event, the National Farmers Federation funded the training at a spare wharf in Australia.
The plan was of a kind long since foreshadowed by the Mont Pellerin
Society, which was formed in the 1930s in Europe in the shadow of
fascism, to plan the political demise of organised labour. As a number
of scholars have noted (see the references in Duncanson 1997), the
Mont Pellerin agenda replicated itself in postwar think-tanks media
propaganda masquerading as opinion pieces, and in corporately sponsored academic work, opposing socialism, and later feminism and new
thinking in historical, cultural and legal studies. Hence the so-called
‘culture wars’ (see, eg, Macintyre & Clark 2003) and the fashion for
vocationalism and corporate bureaucratism in universities (Reid 1996,
Thornton 2004). The scholarship detailing the unfolding of this agenda
is meticulous. As we all now know, much of the vocabulary of the
organisations that embody the agenda resembles the script of Joan
Littlewood’s Oh What a Lovely War, a grim satire of World War I.
Corporately sponsored intellectuals are, in think-tank literature, to bombard enemy intellectuals, conduct artillery barrages and combat with
them, and direct propaganda toward non-intellectuals deemed gullible
and easily led (Carey 1995). Like Littlewood’s generals and royal
mannequins, no doubt, corporate leaders would in this drama, sit back
and wait for the war to be won for them (Cockett 1995, Bakan 2003).
The new government’s Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) appears to have been heavily influenced by just such a corporately sponsored organisation, the HR Nicholls Society. The Australian Senate, in
one of its bursts of independence, refused some of the early drafts. In
the event, applying the Act eventually agreed to, the legality of the
action of sacking union labour, simply for being union labour, was
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rejected by the Federal Court (MUA v Patrick Stevedores in 1998).
The justification offered by the stevedoring company for the sackings,
that the subsidiary company it used to hire labour lacked the assets to
continue to do so was rejected by the court, since, in effect, the state of
affairs had been brought about for just this reason by the principal
company. Employers dislike trades union, of course, much as police
officers find juries inconvenient. Both constitute countervailing powers, potentially contradicting a world-view about what is obvious to
powerful protagonists. We rightly suspect a state that erodes juries by
diminishing their function, that selects them — or ‘pricks’ them in the
18th century term of which EP Thompson reminded us — of becoming dangerously authoritarian (1980). Equally, making due allowance
for a state that presides over a capitalist economy, the subversion of
trades union by legislation and again by bizarre and unacknowledged
conspiracy invites criticism as the attempt of capital and government
to overbalance a constitution with many centres of power, and achieve
untrammelled power for themselves (see Mill 1859 [1975]).
A second event is the Tampa affair and the so-called ‘children overboard’ incidents in 2001. The story, now familiar, is one in which the
federal government, apparently about to lose an election, discovered a
winning rhetorical trope in the conversion of a, by international standards, small number of asylum seekers in boats heading for refuge in
Australia into an engulfing flood from which only the determination
of the incumbent government could save the ‘ordinary Australian’. Even
the normally conservative Australian was led to comment that ‘the
crisis that John Howard would have us believe exists just is not there.
Australia received 6,500 applications for asylum compared with 78,000
in Germany and 74,000 in Britain last year’ (9 November 2001). The
rhetoric resonated with the historical xenophobia that many Australians have inherited as part of the mythology that surrounded a Federation (Trainor 1994) in whose formation in 1901, the:
… big picture ideas [were] no different to those of the German thirties and
forties: of the necessity to create “one people without admixture of races”7
(to use Deakin’s words) ; of unbridgeable racial inferiority; of races destined
to die out; and of the eugenics of progress. Nor were the technologies of
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race management so dissimilar: the enforced separation in concentration
camps; the petty regulation of movement and association (Kalantzis 2001).

Clearly, Australians can no longer be interpellated as members of a
small community of white Christians, beleaguered by hordes of undesirable yellow or brown heathens. Undesirability is now signalled by
the trope of the ‘ordinary Australian’, the stoical, often hard-pressed
but self-sufficient, egalitarian individual, whose wellbeing is at risk
from asylum seekers who will not wait patiently in line to be offered
refuge in Australia. Unfairness and ingratitude are the subtexts of this
discourse. The ordinary Australian — now allowably southern European or Asian — is quietly cultivating his garden and outsiders want to
trespass and enjoy the fruits they have not themselves cultivated
(Duncanson 2003). Public acceptance of the story was assisted in the
1990s and beyond by concealing asylum seekers in remote camps, and
by federal government directions that photographs of their faces were
not to be published. Asylum seekers could not have a face, they could
not be human. One is reminded of the shaven stick figures in striped
uniforms in Nazi camps. The extremity is different, the dehumanising
motive of their captors the same.
In late 2001, a Norwegian container ship, Tampa, rescued around
400 asylum seekers from a sinking boat and sought to disembark them
on Christmas Island, an Australian Territory. The Prime Minister defended his compatriots from this invasion with the promise that ‘those
people will never set foot on Australian soil. Never’.8 Armed special
forces troops were dispatched to the ship despite its master’s urgent
request, instead, for medical supplies to alleviate dehydration, diarrhoea and other sicknesses of the 400 plus passengers on a ship designed for a tiny crew.9 Chillingly reminiscent of the famous Nurnberg
rallies were the campaign posters of the Prime Minister, right arm raised
in a fervour of nationalism and the slogan: ‘We have an absolute right
to determine who comes into this country and the manner of their coming’ (Australian 1 September 2001).
In a second incident, which is perhaps even better known in Australia and elsewhere, because revisited by a Senate inquiry a few months
after, a Navy warship, the Adelaide intercepted a small vessel overfull
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with asylum seekers and described by Navy observers as unseaworthy.
Unsuccessful efforts were made by the Navy to force the boat to return
to Indonesia, but a day later it began to sink. Its passengers began to
abandon it. Photographs were taken, possibly because two sailors from
the warship, a man and a woman, dived into the ocean to help those in
difficulty. In government propaganda, the photographs were represented
as having been taken a day earlier, before the commencement of the
sinking, making room for the additional gloss, that asylum seekers were
throwing their children into the ocean to ‘blackmail’ the warship to
take them to Australia.
David Marr and Marian Wilkinson (2003) expose an arrogance similar to Chrétien’s in the government’s responses. The Australian Minister for Defence almost certainly knew of the deception, but he had
signalled an intention to retire from politics, and subsequently moved
from Defence to a job with a defence contractor. The Prime Minister
and Minister for Immigration were able to say, after the election that
saw them back in office, that they repeated the falsehood because they
were not told it was false. The possibility has now been raised that they
were lying. Before the election, crew from HMAS Adelaide were reported as saying that no children were thrown overboard. A senior public
servant has now revealed that he told the Prime Minister that no evidence existed for the allegation that children were thrown overboard
the evening before Howard made a pre-election speech asserting that
the evidence was compelling (Scrafton 2004). Michelle Gratton, a farfrom-radical Age columnist concluded, ‘the Prime Minister’s honesty
is important: we should not be blasé about new evidence suggesting
that John Howard lied’ (2004). Scrafton’s revelations were dismissed
by the government as conveniently late, but as he pointed out on a TV
interview, he was instructed not to make them to an internal investigation, and he had, as he put it ‘a mortgage and two kids’ (ABCTV 16
August 2004). His then superior, Max Moore-Wilton, was known as
‘Max the Ax’ because of his dismissal of so many public servants.
Worrying as official comfort with deception and deniability may
be for our assessment of the polity, more worrying still is the absence
of any serious institutional corrective. Marr and Wilkinson report public
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service complicity in the lies, and, among other inadequacies in the
political system, the inability of the subsequent Senate inquiry into the
children-overboard incident to compel the testimony of some key
witnesses. And just as Chrétien’s depressing cynicism about public
unconcern seemed vindicated, so do the Australian PM’s description
of the Australian public’s having ‘moved on’ by the time an accurate
account of events and deceptions surfaced in February of the following
year. Old lies are stale lies and the discussion of them belongs,
presumably, to ‘black armband history’, which is the right’s term for
historians who ponder the implications of the massive theft of Aboriginal
land, the massacres and attempted assimilation of Aborigines to the
Europeans (Macintyre & Clark 2003).
If one of the gloomier conclusions in Pepper in Our Eyes was precisely that the Chrétien government’s evident assumption that the public would not be greatly concerned about the probably misuse of the
federal police was correct, the same assumptions are found in the behaviour of Australian governments. As Pue, Margot Young and other
contributors to Pepper saw it, public commitment to liberal democracy was momentarily revealed as dangerously weak. The involvement of emblematic institutions, such as the Mounties for Canadians,
contributors to Pepper argued, are especially likely to encourage the
complacent belief that all is well, and that they are indeed citizens of a
successful liberal democracy.

Unease
One does begin to detect in Australia an anxiety that the public is not
hearing or heeding what the geist of liberal democracy is attempting to
communicate to them. It may be worth quoting at length from the Introduction to a collection edited by Sydney Morning Herald journalist,
Margo Kingston:
This book contends that John Howard [the Australian Prime Minister] is
not a liberal or a Liberal, or a conservative or a Conservative. It seeks to
show that he is part of an ideological wrecking gang made up of radicalpopulist economic opportunists, one which long ago decided that robust
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liberal democracy was an impediment to the real elites — Big Business
and Big Media — that sponsor them, rather than an essential complement
to and underwriter of market capitalism … that Howard’s wrecking gang
… now threatens the long term future of Australian democracy … We are
not consumers … (or) commodities, we are citizens (2004: 4).

But if this seems too partisan, word that not all is well is heard in
seances of a more conservative character. In a statement published in
the press on 9 August 2004, 43 former senior public servants, exambassadors and former heads of the military expressed concerns
summed up by General Gration, ex-Head of the Defence Force:
‘Demonstrably over the last year or two, truth in government has not
been what it should be’. Deception over the motives for invading Iraq
was the catalyst, but for Gration and his colleagues and, he reportedly
adds, many serving diplomats, public servants and members of the
military who cannot speak out, disquiet has been felt about ‘effective
democracy’ in Australia since Tampa and the children overboard affair.
Cavan Hogue, one of the 43, former High Commissioner to Malaysia
and former ambassador to Thailand and the UN is quoted: ‘… we are
not a bunch of pinkoes. There are Liberals [this means, in Australia,
conservatives], Labor and swinging voters among the signatories’
(Sydney Morning Herald 9 August 2004). Again, one cannot press
analogies too far, but government dismissals of 43 retired senior officials
of the military and diplomatic corps as alcohol-soaked has-beens evokes
the rhetoric of many radical-right regimes, whose eagerness to destroy
the credibility of traditions and people who oppose them leads to
extremism.
In a recent collection of essays edited by Robert Manne, one finds
expressed the sentiment that ‘Australia, of course, is nothing like a
classical tyranny, but at the same time it is worth recalling Hume’s
warning that it is seldom that freedom of any kind is lost all at once’.
The author of the essay, William Maley, is described in the information
about contributors as ‘Professor and Director of the Asia-Pacific College
of Diplomacy at the Australian National University’, which is not
generally seen as a hotbed of radical alarmism or overblown polemic.
Writing of the treatment of asylum seekers by middle to senior
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bureaucrats, Maley describes a ‘culture of control … To put it bluntly
much of the bureaucracy has become indifferent to considerations of
common humanity’ (Maley 2004). Hannah Arendt termed this elision
of ethics by bureaucratic routine, of course, the banality of evil.
A minor example of this banality, at least of indifference, was reported in an Age report of 26 February 2004. One Aladdin Sisalem,
beaten up by police in Kuwait for being a Palestinian — he was a guest
worker — by association a supporter of Arafat and therefore by further
association a supporter of Saddam, fled Kuwait, walked across war
zones in West Papua and eventually sailed to the Torres Strait Islands,
where he claimed refugee status. Because he failed to ask immigration
officials for Form 886, according to the report, he was deported and
became part of the Pacific Solution on Manus Island, Papua New
Guinea. At the time of the article, he was living there alone, suffering
depression and costing Australia $23,000 a day — without the cost of
the depression medication, which had been withdrawn. ‘Money well
spent’, Immigration Minister Amanda Vanstone was quoted as responding, referring to the message people such as he apparently send to other
victims of overseas brutality. Government encouragement of a tired
xenophobia, cynicism and sociopathology, which form the context of
responses of this kind, Maley compares with ‘Hitler’s rise to power’.
If this sounds melodramatic, it’s worth remembering that small Hitlers
abound everywhere — in the microcosmic analyses of workplace bullying, for example — causing misery, without the ability, ambition or
capacity for world domination. An early Nazi accolade, we do well to
recall, was awarded to the architect of the eugenics program adopted
by many US states and reflected on poignantly in Martha Collidge’s
film Rambling Rose (see also Gould 1996: ch 7). It is possible that EO
Neville, the Western Australian bureaucrat zealously in charge of that
State’s assimilationist policies from the 1930s, and portrayed in Phillip
Noyce’s film, Rabbit Proof Fence, was unknown to the Third Reich,
and missed being similarly celebrated.

124

The Peronist and the ghost in the state of Australia

The future belongs to me10
From a contemporary Australian perspective, the events examined in
Pepper are signs of a healthy constitution in Canada. The too-cosy
relationship between the federal police (on other occasions, the military) and the government of Ottawa was identified, and recognised as
incipiently anti-democratic, and if Chrétien himself was not held in
some way liable, post-APEC outrage has led to a new awareness of the
importance of police independence from the executive.11 If such a scenario now seems unlikely in Australia, it is pertinent to ask when the
etiolation of citizen into geist began; when did s/he become an uncanny visitor to what might once have been home? One beginning was
foreshadowed by James Bryce, when he distinguished the power of
the monarch to dismiss a British government with the confidence of
the House of Commons — by convention impossible in modern times
— from that apparently acceptable power of the monarch’s colonial
representative to dismiss a government with a majority in its supplyraising assembly in the colonies (Bryce 1901, I: ch 8). Such a power
was, of course, manifested when the Australian Governor-General dismissed a federal Labor government with a lower house majority in
1975.
Two authors locate a transition in governmentality in the 1980s.
Paul Kelly locates such a transition in the end of what he calls the
‘Australian Settlement’ in which employers were given tariff protection against overseas manufacturing competition in return for paying a
judicially determined fair wage (Kelly 1992). Such a link implies that
with the radical reduction of tariffs in the 1980s, the necessity for fairness in the labour market ceased to be a central concern of the state
and, indeed, casualisation of employment and the subversion of the
trades union movement has ensued. The second author, Michael Pusey
(1991: 1), in the work already referred to, places this departure in the
same period as Kelly, although with less confidence in its potential for
social justice. Xenophobia aside, federation has been criticised for trying to square the circle: to reconcile the divergencies between the interests of labour and those of capital by giving labour the vote and by
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subordinating the power of both labour and capital to a judiciary with
a stake in neither camp. Perhaps in Australia, where local capitalists
may often have been nouveau riches, this liberal solution could have
seemed less naive than it would in Britain where judges, City men and
landlords were chums through public school, Oxbridge and gentlemen’s clubs, and shared social outlooks (Cain & Hopkins 1993). In
any event, the traditional pattern of liberal democracy was more thoroughly integrated into an Australian welfare state based on fair wages
and tariffs than was the case in the British model that owed more to the
bureaucratic intervention in the operation of capital envisaged by TH
Green and, later, Keynes and Lord Beveridge, Butler, and the consensus that prevailed in political practice until the 1970s.
As one might expect, then, the dismantling of the Australian version of a welfare state, Kelly’s ‘Australian Settlement’, was much less
insulated than Britain from the much older, inherited, Settlement, made
law in the statute of that name, passed in 1701 in the wake of the English Glorious Revolution, and guaranteeing the independence of the
judiciary from the executive. In 1989, the then federal Labor government removed Justice Staples, a judge appointed with tenure to the
federal Arbitration Court, but sacked by the expedient of repealing the
legislation setting up his court, then creating a new court with all the
judges re-appointed, except Staples. This is in sharp contrast to the
procedure adopted by both the Gladstone and Disraeli administrations
in Britain. There, the Judicature Act 1875 (UK), which reformed the
English High Court structure, preserved existing judicial appointments
to those courts made obsolete by the Act, in accordance with the Act of
Settlement, preserving judicial tenure from extinction without due process, despite Westminster’s then vigorously Diceyan claim to a more
complete sovereignty than the Australian federal Parliament currently
claims. More breathtaking than the Staples sacking itself, perhaps, was
the supine indifference of constitutional lawyers, with the exception of
Michael Kirby (1990). One consults the student texts in vain for some
discussion of this breach of constitutional principle, but not with surprise. More predictable was the response of a descriptive political scientist: we believed that Staples had tenure but then, as it turned out, he
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did not (Solomon 1992: 166). Is this Weimar resignation about the
debacle to come, or the dewy-eyed presentism of HG Wells’ Eloi?
Whatever it is, it does not augur well for the future of liberal democracy in Australia.
What is unleashed, made respectable, is the politics of instrumental rationality and short-term expediency, one that judges institutions
solely in terms of the selected present goals of those currently in power.
On the one hand, this risks what Robert Bolt recognised in the lines he
gives to Thomas More in A Man for All Seasons (1960). In a dispute
with his future son-in-law, Roper, More is urged to have arrested a
man, Richard Rich, who is undoubtedly going to become an informant
against More. More replies that, while Rich is a bad man, there is no
law against that, and that the Devil himself is entitled to benefit of law
— to be tried for what he had done before an impartial tribunal, not for
who he is, or is thought to be. Roper refuses the hypothetical concession of benefit of law to the Devil.
Roper: So you’d give the Devil benefit of law?
More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get
after the Devil?
Roper: I’d cut down every law in England to do that!
More: And when the last law was down and the Devil turned on you,
where would you hide, Roper, the laws being flat? This country’s planted
thick with laws from coast to coast — Man’s not God’s — and if you cut
them down — and you’re just the man to do it — d’you really think you
could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I’d give the
Devil benefit of law for my own safety’s sake (Bolt 1960: 39).

More, or course, lost his head, but to an Absolutism that lost its head
several times, figuratively, before the establishment of the Whig constitution that Bolt’s More represents avant la letter.
On the other hand, the dismantling of liberal/social democratic
traditions in Australia has shifted the state on to the strange terrain of
negative liberty. The concept of the state as protector and guarantor of
fairness that, we saw, underpinned federation, is re-defined partly in
which Quentin Skinner terms the ‘neo-Roman claim that dependence
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constitutes a form of constraint’ (2003: 24). This selective Whig
liberalism, which I suggested was historically the beginning and
politically the precondition of liberal democracy, Skinner writes,
‘worked well for those whose chief concern was to limit arbitrary
power’, but it is a regression from the tenet of federation that a state
that intervened to secure the material welfare of its citizens was not
thereby creating a situation of dependency. A second aspect of this
selectively Whig liberal approach to government is one associated with
Isaiah Berlin, among others. For Berlin, a person is not unfree so long
as another person or group is not intentionally forcing or intimidating
her to do or refrain from doing something. If I am detained, I am unfree.
If I am compelled to enter an unfavourable contract on unequal terms
with an employer, I am not unfree. A poor person who cannot afford
equivalent medical care or education to that obtainable by a rich person,
is not thereby less free. It follows that intervention by the state to rectify
imbalances of this kind — the act of creating positive liberty — is
unjustified and smacks, for Berlin, of incipient totalitarianism.
Inequality is natural — Berlin quotes Helvetius with approval:
The free man is the man who is not in irons, nor imprisoned in a gaol, not
terrorized like a slave for fear of punishment … it is not lack of freedom
not to fly like an eagle or swim like a whale (Berlin 1969: 120).

In a philosophical world in which, dogmatically, ‘everything is what
it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture or
human happiness or a quiet conscience’, inequality is naturalised and
ameliorative measures, although presumably not charity, are unnatural
(Berlin 1969: 122). There is an echo of Malthus here, but also of Hume,
who equates human difference with social inequalities. Thus, the consequence of trying to produce and maintain material equality would be
‘pernicious’ because it would require the repression of ‘men’s different degrees of art, care and industry’: the authority to inquire into inequalities and end them ‘must soon degenerate into tyranny’ (Hume
1777 [1902]: para 155). Berlin, like Hume, believes that one might
enjoy a fuller liberty under a benign absolutism than under a democracy (Hume 1777 [1985]: Essay VII, Forbes 1985: 156 et seq).
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Skinner writes:
The contention that our freedom is taken away only by identifiable acts of
interference worked well for those who wished to insist that contracts were
free so long as they are not coercive and that colonization is legitimate so
long as subject peoples are not actively oppressed (2003: 24).

Current Australian politics are, then, increasingly informed by the
view, rejected at Federation, that persons in ‘dependency’ situations,
on government pensions, for example, are not full citizens and may be
drafted into involuntary work, or, in the case of the unemployed, may
have their movement restricted so that they cannot choose to relocate
to where the cost of living may be lower, but where their chances of reemployment are judged to be lower. The threat to ‘private’ power to
freedom is discounted.

Conclusion
I have suggested, especially in the context of Australia, that the future
of liberal democracy depends on our being able to summon the geist
that is citizenship. The house that s/he haunts is ordered by those who
do not believe in her, who are therefore mortally afraid of her and exist
perpetually in a state of exorcism and denial. A thorough investigation
of the Anglophone premises reveals the post-revolutionary English
learning, in Hume’s words, ‘a lesson in moderation in all our political
controversies’, a constitution premised on compromise, a polity premised on politeness among the people who ruled. But, as the title of
Kathleen Wilson’s book suggests, there was a broader ‘sense of the
people’ (Wilson 1998, see also Wilson 2003), in 18th century politics
until non-sense of it was made in the language of government that
informed the approach to the Thirteen Colonies, and which led to their
revolt. In the British remainder of the Atlantic empire, the sense of the
people grew vaguer, as James Vernon has observed, as the term expanded formally, as those admitted to the franchise widened (1996).
Once the state began to appear to be the product of law rather than
constituted by compromise among the political classes, and law to be
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the will of the sovereign rather than the practice of that compromise,
there was an abstraction with which to eviscerate a promising growth
of political inclusion.
The future of liberal democracy depends upon the institutional settlement discussed and agreed in the half century after the English Revolutions — the separation of powers, the scrutiny of the executive by
the legislature on behalf of the commons, the free availability of information through which public scrutiny is made possible. This future
requires an excavation of the politeness and compromise concealed in
the foundations that are not foundations, not static but ever accommodating change, as well as the Marxian recognition that liberty, pace
Berlin, is equality. Colonel Rainsborough put it well during the Army
debates in 1647: ‘the poorest he hath a right to live as the greatest’ (in
Woodhouse 1986: 53) — unfreedom is inequality in the possibility of
realizing oneself in the recognition that one is one of many other selves.
The deceit, divisiveness and the xenophobia that conceals the oppression of the majority by a minority of obscenely rich, with their
obsequiously affluent managers, behind an appeal to a community
threatened from without, is no more than an obsessive exorcism of
citizenship. In our centuries, we have seen it practised through charisma, but more often through the fearful mediocrity of small grey (actually white) — mostly — men who sacrifice with eagerness the welfare of their fellows for one small moment’s flattery by the rich. In his
ghostly raiment, the citizen watches; like Kipling’s redcoat, s/he sees:
While it’s Tommy this an Tommy that, an “Tommy fall be’ind”,
It’s, “Please to walk in front sir”, when there’s trouble in the wind.
An’ it’s Tommy this an’ Tommy that, an’ anything you please;
An’ Tommy ain’t a bloomin’ fool: you bet that Tommy sees (Kipling 1892
[1994]: 399).
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Notes
1

This article is based on two papers, one given in the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, and one in the Department of Political Science, Melbourne University. Thanks particularly to Wes Pue and Laura
Watts in relation to the former. The latter conference was entitled ‘Geist
’04’, hence my invocation of the supernatural. Thanks to Peter Chen for
organising that. I should like to dedicate my offering to the courage and
inspiration of my son, Sandy Duncanson in having fought and survived so
vigorously his ninth bout of cancer at this time, and to the compassion of
his sisters, Kirsty Duncanson and Danielle Irvine for their help to him in
doing so. Also, I owe so much more on this difficult occasion than the
usual incisive criticism and encouragement from Judith Grbich and the
help that she always dedicates to my work.

2

‘Privatisation’ assumes a distinction between government and the public
contradicts a fairly basic notion that governments own nothing except that
which the public provides, the deployment of which it is therefore entitled
to scrutinise — at least on the Revolutionary principles that ‘have continued to provide a template for constitutions and political manifestos to the
present day’ (Prest 1998: 68).

3

A recent ABC Radio interview with a former diplomat critical of Australia’s policy on Iraq was cancelled after the announcement of the federal
election date on the basis that broadcast criticism might be construed as
bias. It might more likely be construed, one would have thought, as free
speech.

4

It may be no accident that the musical emphasising the poignancy of the
Argentinean’s widow was by Andrew Lloyd Webber, apparently a staunch
supporter of Margaret Thatcher.

5

Production, not distribution, is vital for Teschke, since it requires institutional facilitation in particular territories.

6

‘… the understanding, when it acts alone and according to its most general
principles, entirely subverts itself and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life’ (267–8).

7

‘Ordinary Australian’ is the current government’s preferred trope.

8

Many of the Tampa rescuees, re-routed to camps on Pacific islands whose
agreement to provide them with temporary accommodation was not
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unrelated to their economic dependence on Australia, did indeed set foot
in Australia because they were found to be refugees.
9

Ironically, the crew of the warship Adelaide were immediately dispatched
to help confront the supposed dangers posed by the dictator many of the
rescuees were fleing. The SAS, whose units were landed to ‘secure’ Tampa
were soon in action on the ground against that very regime, also, to destroy a regime in an action, as we have seen, retrospectively justified on
the ground that it brutally repressed its people.

10 This is the title of a song from the Bob Fosse film, Cabaret, loosely based
on Christopher Isherwood’s Goodbye to Berlin. The singer plays a member of the Hitler Youth and the song’s theme, like that of the film, is the
replacement by new, younger men of vigour and direct methods, of the
older, Weimar democratic tolerance — or, from a Nazi perspective, its
inefficiency and decadence.
11 Pepper’s editor, Professor Pue, now regularly advises the RCMP on the
ethics of its relations with government.
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